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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
LIVINIA ALLEN, also known as )\
Livinia Smith,
Appellant,
-vs.-

E~~~~E~: !ts~~f: ~:~k::!G~
Alfred Saunders Allen,

\(
\

Case No .. 7247

Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
That on the 12th day of January 1929 the Deceased
Luisa Allen a widow deeded by quit claim deed to the
Appellant and the Respondent Edward F. Allen the
following described tract of land in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah; to-wit:
Commencing at a point 21;2 rods North of
the Southeast Corner of Lot 8, Block 41~ Plat
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"B", Salt Lake City Survey; thence North 2%
rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 21f2 rods;
thence East 10 rods to beginning
and thereupon the said Luisa Allen, Deceased delivered
said deed to the County Recorder of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah for the purpose of record, and the same
was recorded in accordance with her request, and that
said deed, upon such record was returned to her, and
that she retained the instrument until her death occurred
on the 2nd day of July 1947. That in said last mentioned
deed, the Deceased retained a lifeesta te in and to the
premises involved. (Tr. 2.)
That on the 12th day of September 1946 the said
Luisa Allen made and executed a quit claim deed to the
Respondents, to-wit; Edward F. Allen and Peggy Allen,
his wife, conveying unto them the realty involved in the
litigation. (Tr. 7.)
The defense to the first deed involved is by way of
equitable defense and counter-claim ''rherein Respondents allege several defenses, to-wit:
FIRST: That the first deed in question was never
delivered, therefore second deed good.
SECOND: That in the event the first deed v,ras delivered, it "ras a will, and therefore null and void.
THIRD: Moneys spent upon said :premises by 'vay
of offset, contributions and subrogation, to-,vit: repairs,
payment of mortgage, taxes, insurance and general
upkeep. (See Pleadings 1 to 127.)
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The respondent Ed"~ard F, Allen testified in the
trial of said cause that the payments made by hin1 subsequent to the first deed in issue, January 12th, 1929
were made gratuitously, voluntarily and of his own free
":ill and accord, and that he knew nothing at the time of
said payments concerning the first deed in question.
(Tr. 92-132.)
That at or about the time the Deceased passed R\vay,
the respondents obtained from her the second deed in
question, at which time the Deeeased was aged, infirm
and ill. That the respondents thought that the Appellant
knew of the second conveyance, 'vhen made, but "\Vas.
not sure. ( Tr. 23-63, 92-132.)
The home involved herein had a rental value of
a:Ptpro:ximately $75.00 per month from the year 1929 to
the present time. (Tr. 79-81.) That the Deceased served
the respondent together with his 'Yife over a period of
years of the value for said services in the sum of $50.00
per month. (Tr. 83-85.)
That the Respondents "\vaived by virtue of stipulation their defense hy way of contrib_ution, subrogation
and equitable defenses, and stand upon the second deed
as executed by the Deceased, and wrhich the Trial Court
held to .be valid whieh is the main issue involved herein.
(Tr. 129-145.)
That subsequent to tT an nary 12th, 1929 or the exeeution of the first deed in question tax notices "Tere sent
out by the Treasurer's Office, Salt l.Jake County, State
of TJtah, to thP threr partie~ namPd in ~aid deed, to-,Yit:
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Livinia Allen, Edward F. Allen and Luisa Allen, addressed to 334 South 9th East Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, said notices being sent out annually from 1929
on up1 to and including 1947.
The Appellant resided in the home in question from
1929, date of the first deed on up until May 1936 at
which time she married and vacated said premises and
returned to said home in 1943 for the purpose of taking
care of her Deceased Mother, and has resided therein
ever since that date. (Tr. 288.)
That the Res:pondent Edward F. Allen resided part
time alone and part time 'vith his wife in said residenee
since the date of the first deedfor a period of fifteen
years and five months. (Tr. 289.)
Neither party paid rent on said premises during
said period of time with the exception of Appellant and
Respondent Ed"rard F. Allen contributing money and
services for the maintenance and support of the Mother.
That Edward F. Allen gave the money each year for the
payment of said taxes based upon the First Deed, and
the Mother made the :payments to the County Treasurer,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah for the purpose of
obtaining her Widow's exemption. That Edward F.
Allen and his wife Peggy Allen left in the year 1943
for Tennessee, at which time the Appellant moved back
in the home for the purpose of caring for the mother
at the solicitation of Mrs. Peggy Allen, respondent, and
remained in the home up until on or about the 12th
day of September 1946, during which period of time the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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.A.ppellant paid all of the bills for c.oal, water and groceries and attended to the wants of her mother, (Tr.
287, 288.)
The respondents returned from T·ennessee on or
about the 12th day of Se:ptember 1946, at which time
Edward F. Allen obtained the services of a lawyer and
had deed prepared in favor of Respondents conveying
the title of said realty to them, and due to the physical
condition of Mrs. Luisa Allen at such time she swore
under oath over the telephone to a Notary Public (Tr.
287) and he had same recorded 'vith the County Recorder, Salt Lake County, State of lTtah.
That the said Luisa Allen died in Salt Lake County,
Stote of lTtah on Julp 2nd, 1947. (Tr. 2.)
That "Jlrs. Luisa Allen at no time or at all repudiated the deed executed in favor of Appellant and Respondent in 1929, and when asked by the Appellant v.rhy
she had executed the second deed of 1946, she merely
stated that Edw,.ard F. Allen wanted the property. (Tr.
394.
That at all times the Appellant kne'v of the execution
of the deed of 1929 in her favor~ as she and her mother
went to the Office ofanAttorney for the express purpose
of having same drafted and duly exeeuted. (Tr. 393.)
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Appellant assigns as error the following upon which
she relies for a reversal of the judgment, decree and
orders of the court:
1. That the findings and decree are not supported
by the evidence.
2. That the court erred In denying Appellant's
Motion for New Trial.
3. That the court erred in upholding the deed
under date of September 12, 1946, and failing to uphold
the deed of January 12, 1929.
4. The court erred in admitting in evidence all
conversations had between deceased and respondents
or either of them.
ARGUMENTS OF POINTS 1, 2,

AND

3

That the evidence conclusively shows that the deed
of January 12, 1929 was delivered by the· deceased to
the grantees, the appellant and respondent in this action
where the deceased reserved a life estate unto herslf.
After the execution by Luisa Allen of said deed, she
had same recorded with the County Recorder of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, and Ap;pellant contends by
virtue of this fact that such deed was duly delivered.
''It is already settled that the recording of
a deed constitutes delivery to the grantee"
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Fooshee vs. Kasenberg, 102 Pac. 2d, 995 ICan.
Balin v~. Osoba, 91 Pac, 37, 76 Kan. 234.
Carver vs. :Nlain, 69 Pac. 2d 681, 146 Kan.
231-237.
''Where the deed is intentionally recorded hy
the grantor, manual delivery of the deed thereafter is not necessary to make it effectual''.
Turner vs. Close, 264 Pac. 1047, 125 Kan. 485.
"In the absence of express disclaimer, the
acceptance by the grantee is presumed''.
Wuester vs. Folin, 56 Pac. 490, 60 l{an. 334.
Miller vs. Miller, 131 Pac. I__;.R.A. 1915-A,· 671
"'"-\ nn. Cas. 1917-A, 918.
That the recording of said deed by the said Luisa
Allen was constructive notice to the world pertaining
to said conveyance.
In the case of Payne vs. Henderson, 172 N.E. 173,
340 lll. 160, a1nong other things held:
"3. That the reservation of a life estate in
the Grantor raises a prestnnption that the deed i:-;
intended to operate immediately as a conveyance
of the future estate 'vhieh is vest in possession at
the termination of the life estate and in such case
the retention of the deed by the grantor is not
inconsistent with the idea that delivery "\Va~ intended, and that it is operative~ a;;;; therE' "\vonld
be no object in retaining n life estate if the deed
\vere not to be effectual as a convE~yanrP or \\·a~
retained to prevent its taking effect until the
death of the grantor".
"4. Where a grantor has rPser,~P(l a lifP
estate in the land conveyed by· him. he is as mneh
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
entitled to the custody of the deed as the grantee.
Also to the same effect Humphreys vs. Humphreys, 300 Ill. 46".
'' 5. Where a grantor has .conveyed a five·
acre tract to his granddaughter by way of voluntaryt settlement, reserving in himself a life estate,
·the fact that he subsequently sold an adjoining
tract "'\\7hich because of some unexplained error
included an eleven foot strip off the five acres
does not show that his previous deed to his granddaughter 'vas not intended to be effective.''
Also to the same effect Riegel vs. Riegel, 243 lll.
622, Hill vs. Greiger, 250 Ill. 408.
In the case of Johnson vs. Young Men's Bldg. &
Loan Association, 60 S.W. 2d 925, 187 Ark. 430, the
court held:
''Acceptance of deed to a son from his parents will be presumed where the grant is beneficial to him. A deed to a minor son from his
parents may be accepted by them for him. Where
parents executed a deed to their son intending to
retain possession of the property deed to their
son until death of one of the parents, their retention of the deed and failure to record it held not
to overcome the presumption of delivery,
Where parents executed a deed to their son
intending to retain possession of the :property
until the death of one of the grantors, their continued possession and control and leasing of the
property held not to nullify the apparent intention of delivery. Since the grantor had the intention, and purpose of retaining the possession of
the property until the death of one or the other
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of them, they had the right to retain the deed to
effect this purpose''.
In the case of Graham vs. Suddeth, 97 Ark. 283,
133 S.W. 1023, the court held:
''The acceptance of deed is presumed where
the grant is beneficial to the grantee''.
The court held in Gribbs vs. Walker, 74 Ark. 104,
85 s.w. 224:
"The fact that a deed \vas found among his
papers at his death raises no presumption against
delivery if the grantor reserved an interest in the
property conveyed and therefore had an interest
in the preservation of the deed''.
In the case of McKemey YS. l{etchum, 188 Iowa,
1081, 175 N.W. 325, the court held:
''Delivery will be presumed from the execution and acknovvledgement of the deed, together
\Yith testimony tending to shovv intention to pass
title even though grantor retain~ full possession
of deed until his death.''
In the case of La,vson vs. Boo, 287 N.W. 282., lo"\\7a,
the Con rt held :
/

''After being signed and ackno,vledged by
the grantor, is placed on record by him 'vith intention of making the ·record stand for delivery~
title will pass to the grantee assuming that there
is acceptance by them of th0 title''.
In the case of J\lliller vs. Miller, 91 Kans. 1, L.R.A.
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1915-A, 671, 'Ann. Cas. 1917-A, 918, the court held:
"The remainders are not accelerated by the
refusal of: the son to accept the conveyance of the
life estate to him. The recording of the deed by
the grantor made deed effective as to all persons
benefited by it, who did not dissent. The intention of the grant is to be ascertained from the
language employed in the deed".
The case of Wuester vs. Folin, 60 Kans. 334, 56
Pac. 490, the court held:
''A formal acceptance by the grantee is not
required. Where the grant is clearly beneficial
to the grantee, his acceptance of it is presumed
in the absence of Jlroof to the contrary, and this
presumption is not overcome of anything short
of the actual dissent of the granteP ".
"Where the grantor reserves a life estate
in the property and it's possession and control,
his retention of the deed is not inconsistent with
the idea that 8l delivery was intended.''
See 18 Corpus Juris Section 96, page 201- Note 48.
Appellant calls the court's attention to Section 78-3-2
Volume 4, Utah Code Annotated 1943
''Every conveyance or instrument in writing
affecting real ·estate executed, acknowledged or
provided and certified in the manner .prescribed
by this title, and every patent to lands within this
state duly executed and verified according to
la,v, and every judgment, order or decree of any
Court of record in this State or a copy thereof
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required by law to be recorded in the Office of
the County Recorder shall from the time of filing
of the same with the recorder for record import
notice to all persons of the contents thereof and
subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien
holders shall be deemed to purchase and take
"ith notice.''
In the case of Sheppick vs. Sheppick et al, 138 Pac.
1169 (Utah)
''Wherein a man and woman had a large
. family of children, the oldest of whom was nineteen years of age. He purchased acreage and a
small home for his Mother and Father, ~paying
$300.00 therefor, and obtaining a deed running
in his favor to the permises. The Mother and
Father were old, sick and indigent. They took
possession and raised their family. The court
held under all circumstances that the Father
held and o1vned a life estate therein, and that the
son, who purchased the premises held the fee
thereto as remainderman. That the father and
mother, during their life time paid the taxes
assessed against the premises. They tore do,vn
the home and erected a new home, cultivated the
soil and planted fruit trees. That at the time the
father died, the value of the property had been
increased from $300.00 to approximately $1500.00,
and the heirs of the deceased attempted to obtain
contribution by 1vay of the impro-vements that
enhanced the value of the premises 'vherein said
court stated:
''No doubt the court based its con elusion
upon the fact that the value of the land had been
enhanced through the efforts and labor of the
defendant and his family. '''hile it is true that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the purchase :price of the land was only $300.00 or
$350.00 and that the value thereof with the improvements which were placed thereupon by the
family was at the time of the trial sho,vn to be
about $1500.00, yet it is also true that defendant
and the family enjoyed the use of the land during
all those years ·with whatever improvements they
placed thereon. And then the equities therefore
were not all in favor of plaintiff or defendant.
The legal title of said land was and now is in
plaintiff's name, and that gives him the right to
the whole land unless he has voluntarily disposed
of it or has been legally deprived of his title".
''We know of no principal, either legal or
equitable by which the plaintiff under the facts
and circumstances of this case can be deprived of
his land, or any part thereof. If we could deal
with the matter in accordance with 'vhat may be
termed fireside equity or justice or from a purely
moral point of vie"\\r, we should pTohably not feel
inclined to criticise the result reached by the
District Court. We are reminded, however that
courts under our system of jurisprudence are not
autocrats, and that their judgments and decrees
must be sanctioned by and passed upon established legal and equitable rules, and not upon
Inere moral rights or claims, From a moral point
of view, the plaintiff should perhaps share the
enhanced value of the property with his brothers
and sisters, but we know of no legal or equitable
principal by which he can he required to do so.
Both the father and mother having died, he is
entitled to claim his own. The District Court
therefore erred in attempting to enforce \Vhat .
.may be termed to be a purely moral obligation".
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ARGUMENT ON POINT 4
The court allowed Edward F. Allen and Peggy
All·en, his wife, respondents to testify to conversations
had with the deceased in reference to the deeds• in issue
in this case, and that appellant objected to said witnesses ·
introducing said conversations under what is commonly
known as the death statute, and the court granted ap:pellant a standing obj·ection thereto, but allowed said
evidence to ,be placed in the record by the said 'vitnesses.
Section 104-49.-2 Utah Code Annotated 1943, Volume
6, Subdivision 3 :
"A party to any civil action, suit or :proceeding, and any person directly interested in the
event thereof, and any person from, through or
under whom such party or interested person derives his interest or title or any part thereof,
when the adverse party in such action, suit or
proceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends
as Guardian of an insane or devisee of any deceased person or as Guardian, assignee or grantee
directly or remotely of such heir, legatee or devisee as to any staten1ent by, or transaction \Yith
such deceased, insane or incompetent person or
matter of fact, \vhatever \vhich must have been
equally within the kno\vledge of both the 'vitnesses, and such insane, incompetent or deceased
person unless such \Vi bH\ss is called to testify
thereto by such adverse party so claiming or
opposing, suing or defending in such action. suit
or proeeeding".
Subdivision (3) of this section applies 'vherever
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and whenever the interest of the witnesses called are
hostile and adverse to, and in conflict with the interests
of the person against whom they are called. Such witnesses being parties to the action, and directly interested
in the event thereof.
Mawson vs. Gray, 78 U. 542, 551, 6 Pac.
" 157.

2d~

STATEMENT AND· ARGUMENT UPON THE
P ARTICIJLAR QUESTIONS INVOLVED
The main issue involved in this case at this time is
whether or not the first deed executed on January 12,
1929 by the deceased, wherein she reserved a life estate
in and to said premises, is valid. In connection with its
validity, there is only one question raised, to-wit: Was
said deed delivered in accordance with law~ On this
question the record conclusively shows that the deed
vvas regularly signed and executed by the deceased, and
thereafter by her recorded with the County Recorder
of Salt Lake County, and that at all times mentioned the
appellant knew of such conveyance. The respondents
· having testified that they knew nothing of same until
after they obtained a deed to said premises by virtue of
the conveyance under date of September 12, 1946. That
Luisa Allen retained possession of the deed of 1929
after it had been recorded on up until the time of her
death, "\Vhich is not inconsistent with delivery of title,
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and the logical thing to do by a party who holds a life
estate and the remainderman named therein receiving
no title to the premises until her death. That since the
year 1929 up to the year of 1947 inclusive, tax notices
were sent annually to the place of the abode of the
parties to this action, and upon said tax notices appeared
the names of the three parties named in said deed. That
Edward F. Allen paid the taxes upon said premises in
accordanee with said tax notices, and that the said
Edward F. Allen occupied said premises as his home
since the year 1929 over a period of fifteen years and
five months. That at no time or at all did the appellant
disaffirm her interest in and to said deed, and whatever
Edward F. Allen desired to do "rith his interest therein
was his privilege, although at this stage of the case, he
has openly rejected and renounced any interest in and to
said conveyance. The "\vriter sincerely contends that the
facts and circumstances in this case surrounding the
first deed in question conclusively shows an unqualified
delivery under la,,r.
The second deed llpheld by the Trial ,Judge executed
years subsequent to the first deed conveyed, if any thing,
the deceased's life entate, and upon her demise any
interest in and to said property by virtue of said conveyance was extinguished. Ed,vard F. Allen testified
that all payments that he n1ade as shown by the Bill of
Particulars in this case 'vere made for the sole benefit
of his mother, and were made voluntarily and gratu~
tously, and not for the purpose of protecting him as a
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remainderman under the first deed for the reason that
he at no time knew anything about the first conveyance,
and still in view of the fact by virtue of numerous pleadings asked for contribution and subrogation, and after
claiming contribution and subrogation, he ·and his wife
demanded the entire property by virtue of the second
deed. The position taken in· this case by the respondents
by virtue of their equitable counter-claims involves distinct equitable actions which are repugnant to and inconsistent 'vith one another:
1st : They rely upon the first quit claim
under date of January 12, 1929, and demanded
contribution and subbrogation.
2nd: They relJi upon second deed under date
of Sept. 12, 194"6, claiming title to said premises
thereunder.
3rd : That the deed of January 12, 1929 was
in truth and in fact executed by Luisa Allen as
her Last Will & Testament and therefore void,
although the respondent Ed"\\rard F. Allen made
the respective payments by virtue of the fact that
he was heir at la"\\7 of his deceased mother, and
made them to protect his right of inheritance
together with that of the Appellant, his sister.
It is fundamental in equitable jurisprudence that a
party cannot claim relief u:pon matters and things that
are not germane to his original elaim, and it is apparent
by the pleadings in this case that the respondents desired
to set up as many distinct and separate transactions
upon which to stand as could be conceived, and of course,
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it is a cardinal principal of equity that a party s-eeking
relief must show good faith, and as the records now
stand, there is only one proposition involved, and that is,
which of the deeds: in question are valid.
There is no dispute between the parties that the
reasonable rental value of the !premises in issue was
and is $75.00 per month. That over a period of fifteen
years, and five months the respondents occupied said
premises, and under the record in this case the proportionate part of respondents' rental value would be In
excess of the sums that 'vere paid by them.
Appellant sincerely contends that the Trial Court
erred in holding that the first deed was invalid for lack
of delivery, and in upholding the second deed thereby
vesting title in respondents and that said cause should
be reversed with instructions to the Trial Judge to enter
proper Findings, Decree and Judgment in accordance
with the contention of appellant herein, Appellant should
recover her costs and expenses incurred in this Appeal.
Respectfully su bmi tterl,

WM. r~. BEEZLEY,
Attorney fo1'" Appellant.
• .,.il
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